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I largely agree with the burden of Tom Willging's paper assessing
the use and misuse of the Manual on Complex Litigation.1 Thus, I will
say less about that paper than I will about the assertions of those
speakers and participants at this Symposium2 and others in different
fora who have asserted that dramatic changes in federal law are ap-
propriate to deal with the problem of mass tort litigation.3 I am ut-
terly unpersuaded that anything argued today-or during the last fif-
teen years of this debate-provides a plausible basis for displacing
state law by substantial changes in federal law, since tort law and in-
surance law traditionally and properly have been the province of state
and not federal law.
The cluster of problems associated with mass tort litigation today
are not problems that result in the frustration of any federal substan-
tive policy. Is any statute of Congress going unenforced? Is any ex-
ecutive decision going unimplemented? The principal problem of
mass tort litigation for the federal government and federal policy to-
day is due to congestion in the federal district courts caused by the
avalanche of state tort claims that have found their way there. How
did that come about? Did Congress change the law? No. Did the
federal courts change their jurisdiction or procedures in a dramatic
way? No. In fact, the current state of congestion arose largely for two
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, George Washington
University Law School.
I SeeThomas E. Willging, Beyond Matufity: Mass Tort Case Management in theManual
for Complex Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2225 (2000).
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3 See infra notes 22-32.
4 See Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalization, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 780-82 (1995) (describing mass tort litigation as a complex ag-
gregate of cases that originated as individual state or federal cases).
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reasons. First, as a result of the more adventurous nature of our
medicine, we now put devices in our bodies that we never did before,
and we now use drugs and products that we either did not have before
or dared not use before.5 Second, state legislatures and state supreme
court justices have changed state tort law and state insurance law.
They have expanded available claims and remedies to include such
things as medical monitoring claims,6 fear of cancer claims,7 and emo-
tional distress claims.8 They have adopted market share theories9 and
revised the plaintiff's burden of proof in other situations with respect
to proof of fault or causation. ° Were those good decisions or bad de-
5 SeeKenneth T. Sigman, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Bad Medicine for Manufacturers of
Unproven Medical Devices, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 721, 727 (1998) (discussing litigation
over the implantation of a defective new version of the cardiac pacemaker); James M.
Wood, The Judicial Coordination of Drug and Device Litigation: A Review and Critique, 54
FOOD & DRUGLJ. 325, 330-31 (1999) (identifying the mass marketing of products as a
source of increased mass tort litigation).
6 See, e.g., Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 430 (W. Va. 1999)
(recognizing a claim for medical monitoring as a "proper subject of compensatory
damages"); see also Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 696 A.2d
137, 143-47 (Pa. 1997) (discussing the elements needed to establish a claim for medi-
cal monitoring under Pennsylvania common law). But see Andrew 1. Klein, Rethinking
Medical Monitoring, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 4 (1998) ("[A]wards for medical monitoring
in toxic exposure cases are unusual .... ."); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitor-
ing-Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1063 (1999) (criticizing
recent changes in tort law that expand the scope of available claims and remedies).
For a discussion of recent developments in class treatment of medical monitoring
claims, see generally Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Fabrice N. Vincent, Class Certifwation of
Medical Monitoring Claims in Mass Tort Product Liability Litigation, SE01 ALI-ABA 1, 5-27
(1999).
7 SeeFibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 675 (Tex. App. 1991) (upholding a
jury instruction allowing ajury to consider fear of cancer as mental anguish in deter-
mining damages); Kenneth W. Miller, Toxic Torts and EmotionalDlistress: The Case for an
Independent Cause of Action for Fear of Future Harm 40 AIZ. L. REV. 681, 686 (1998) (ar-
guing that Arizona should recognize a fear of future harm cause of action).
8 See Adams v. U.S. Homecrafters, Inc., 744 So. 2d 736, 743 (Miss. 1999) (allowing
claims for emotional distress without requiring a showing of physical manifestation in
simple negligence cases); Miller, supra note 7, at 685 (advocating the recognition of
negligently inflicted emotional distress claims in Arizona).
9 See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (holding drug manufactur-
ers liable in a class action based on their share of the national market); Joel W. Baar,
Let the Drug Dealer Beware: Market-Share Liability in Michigan for the Injuries Caused by the
Illegal Drug Market, 32 VAT. U. L. REV. 139, 144 (1997) (discussing the use of market-
share liability in civil suits against drug dealers).
10 See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990) (reviewing the various ways
courts have extended traditional burden of proof of fault and burden of causation
principles in mass tort litigation). For a discussion of burden of proof barriers, see
generally Suzanne Ernst Drummond, DES and Market Share Liability in Ohio--A Lesson in
How What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Sutowski v. Eli Lilly, 669 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio
1998), 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1331, 1333 (1999) ("Under conventional theories of prod-
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cisions? I think most of them were good, but as a proceduralist and as
a professor who is in no position to change those decisions, that does
not matter. They were properly made by state legislatures and state
supreme court justices interpreting the common law of their state. It
is not clear why any of us believe we have any mandate for reversing
those decisions or for changing federal law because of these changes
in state law.
Moreover, many proponents of changing federal law have ne-
glected to mention the major roles that insurance and insurance law
play in mass tort litigation. Unlike antitrust or securities fraud claims,
where the loss largely falls on the wrongdoer, in mass tort litigation
the loss is largely shifted to a third party insurance carrier," and by
them, through facultative and treaty reinsurance to reinsurance syndi-
12cates in London. Because it is the source of the money that pays the
plaintiff's bar, the defense bar, and the plaintiffs, the insurance indus-
try is a very important player in mass tort litigation. The law of insur-
ance has been-just like state tort law-the appropriate province of
state legislatures and state supreme courts for a very long time.'8 The
direct regulation of insurance companies remains today almost en-
tirely a state responsibility.'
4
ucts liability the [plaintiffs'] ... inability to prove causation by a particular pharmaceu-
tical company would bar their ability to recover.").
1 See, eg., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir.
1995) (adjudicating the responsibilities of an insurance company in an asbestos case).
12 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (involving a suit by a health insurance company against a reinsurer to indemnify
its mass tort liability obligations); First Am. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Gen. Ins. Co.,
954 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (describing reinsurance contracts as they re-
late to insolvency of an insurance company); Carole D. Bos, A Solvency Perspective: Con-
cerns of Insurance Carriers in Dealing with Lloyd's and the London Marke COVERAGE,
May/June 1994, at 19 (discussing the use of reinsurance by Lloyd's of London, a major
insurance carrier).
is See McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994) ("No Act of
Congress shall be construed to... impair... any law enacted by any State for the pur-
pose of regulating the business of insurance.... ."); United States v. South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 544-45 (1944) (discussing the history of cases that hold
that the business of insurance did not constitute interstate commerce); Bancoklahoma
Mortgage Corp. v. Capital Title Co., 194 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 1999) (using state law to
adjudicate an insurance fraud case); Grimes v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 857 F.2d 699, 702
(10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act leaves regulation of insur-
ers to the states); U.S. Fin. Corp. v. Warfield, 839 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(stating that since the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, the power to regulate insur-
ance law resided with the states); Mendola v. Dineen, 57 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1945) (discussing the history of cases that hold that the business of insurance did
not constitute interstate commerce).
14 SeeJeffry Clay Clark, The United States Proposal for a General Agreement on Trade in
Services and Its Preemption ofInconsistent State Law, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMw. L. REv. 75, 87
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In other words, as we debate what to do about mass tort litigation,
we are intruding into two areas that for two centuries have been left to
the states. That this is so is not because of an idle or passive deference
to state law: since the 1930s we have been willing to regulate all sorts
of behavior through the federal government. But while doing so,
Congress has scrupulously, and with very few excepons,'5 respected
the right of the states to develop, enforce, and apply state norms as to
what kinds of behaviors give rise to a private action for damages in
tort.6 So while the Federal Aviation Administration comprehensively
regulates the airline industry,17 passengers injured in crashes sue un-
der state law.'8 The safety and efficacy of prescription drugs are regu-
lated by the federal Food and Drug Administration, but state law pro-
vides the remedy for those hurt by such products.'9 OSHA regulates
working conditions of buildings and construction sites, but injuries
are remedied under state law.2
Federal courts have long respected this province of states to make
tort law, even in the most extreme cases. The Second Circuit some
years ago held that state, not federal law, governs the claims of soldiers
fighting in the same battalion in Vietnam who were exposed to Agent
(1992) (noting that since 1944, U.S. courts have allowed the states to regulate the in-
surance sector under the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Mathew P. Harrington, Health Care
Cimes: Avoiding Overenforcemen4 26 RUTGERS LJ. 111, 134 (1994) ("The regulation of
insurance carriers has thus far been left to the states."); Lawrence Dunn, Note, Insur-
ance Sales Powers of National Banks Under 12 U.S.C. § 92, 89 N.Y.L ScH. L. REv. 801, 828
(1994) (noting that the McCarran-Ferguson Act made insurance law a preserve of the
states).
is See Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 920-21 (1996) (giving the example of the 1908 Federal Employer's
Liability Act, which federalized the tort liability of interstate railroads, as an exception
to the claim that American "tort law has always been state law").
16 See id. at 921 (noting that "the tradition of state tort law has held up remarkably
well").
17 See Federal Aviation Administrative Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 106 (1994)
(enumerating the responsibilities of the FAA); see, e.g., Northwest Airlines Inc. v. FAA,
795 F.2d 195, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (supporting the FAA's override of an individual air-
line's suspension of a pilot).
is See Martin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 630 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that "the Federal Aviation Act was not intended to preempt state com-
mon law negligence claims"). See generally StuartJ. Starry, Torts at Twenty Thousand Feet:
FederalPreemption in CommercialAviation, 23 BRIEF: A.B.A. SEC. TORT& INS. PRAC. 8, 44
(Fall 1993) (discussing the arguments for and against the recognition of a federal
common law claim for aviation-related injuries).
19 See Food and Drug Administration Act § 903(b)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)
(1994) (enumerating the powers of the FDA).
20 See Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994) ("OSHA");
Traudt v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 692 A.2d 1326 (D.C. 1997) (dealing with a state
law tort claim for violation of the OSHA).
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Orange. Even though the federal government had purchased this ar-
guably toxic and dangerous herbicide for use in a foreign war into
which many plaintiffs had been conscripted, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the claims of the plaintiffs against the suppliers of this war
material were governed by state tort law.21 If the rights of conscripted
veterans in a foreign war are properly measured under state law-not
federal law-then it hardly seems plausible that because of congestion
in the federal district courts, we should abandon our traditional def-
erence to state tort law in favor of a federal law solution. Yet some
suggest that Klaxon2 be reversed,s that Van Dusen4 be reversedss that
Lexecon 6 be reversed,2 that federal subject matter jurisdiction be ex-
panded to facilitate the aggregation of state tort claims in federal
court,28 that state laws regarding attorneys' fees be replaced by federal
law,2 that state choice-of-law rules be replaced by federal choice-of-law
21 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that state law
governed the claims).
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that federal
courts must look to the law of the state in which they sit in determining questions of
choice of law).
23 See, eg., Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37
BRAND s L.J. 21, 22 (1998) (arguing that Klaxon "was poorly reasoned" and that "the
Constitution did not mandate the decision").
24 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 643 (1964) (holding that a § 1404(a) trans-
fer of venue does not change the applicable state law).
See, e.g., Maryellen Coma, Confusion and Dissension Surrounding the Venue Transfer
Statutes, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 319, 335-36 (1992) ("Imposing the requirement of [forum]
convenience at the outset... will reduce the necessity for 'remedial' transfer and will
promote judicial economy." (footnote omitted)).
26 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998)
(holding that a court conducting pretrial procedures for consolidated mass tort ac-
tions cannot assign the litigation to itself for trial).
27 See S. 248, 106th Cong. § 5 (1999) (overruling Lexecon to permit multidistrict
consolidation for liability and punitive damages purposes); H.R. 1752, 106th Cong.
§ 310 (1999) (permitting multidistrict trial consolidation for all purposes); H.R. 1852,
106th Cong. (1999) (same); Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Forum Selection and
Concurrent Federal State Jurisdiction, SE28 ALI-ABA 277, 395-99 (1999) (expressing con-
cern over negative practical effects of the Lexecon decision). But see Benjamin W. Lar-
son, Case Comment, Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lench: Respecting
the PlaintiFs Choice ofForum, 74 NoTREDAME L. REV. 1337 (1999) (defending the result
in Lexecon).
28 See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Charles Gardner Geyh, The Case in Support of Legis-
lation Facilitating the Consolidation of Mass-Accident Litigation: A View from the Legislatur4
73 MARi L. REV. 535, 554 (1990) (suggesting expanding diversityjurisdiction as a way
to avoid "impediments to federal consolidation of complex litigation").
SeeJudith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119
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rules, 0 that state tort law should give way to a national tort law,3' and
that federal-not state-law govern punitive damages. What federal
interest justifies such a displacement of state tort law? Or state con-
flicts law? Or punitive damages law? Are crowded federal dockets a
sufficient predicate for putting aside centuries of federal deference to
state lawmaking in torts and insurance law? Would not a more ra-
tional response to crowded federal dockets due to state tort claims be
changes intended to reduce-not increase-the volume of state tort
claims in federal court?
We have crowded federal district court dockets because state gov-
ernments have been imposing this burden on a branch of the federal
government and not the other way around. In other contexts, the
federal government has been active over the past ten years in passing
legislation in which people are given rights where the cost of provid-
ing those rights is borne by someone else. For example, with the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990P8 Congress created a new set of
entitlements, but the accommodations thus mandated are paid for by
employers and property owners.m Likewise, Congress passed the Fam-
(2000) (discussing the need for revision of current handling of attorney fees in mass
tort litigation and arguing for increased disclosure and federal regulation).
30 See ALI, CO PLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS
321-23 (1994) (proposing uniform federal criteria for the choice of state law in mass
tort cases); see also Thomas M. Reavley & Jerome W. Wesevich, An Old Rule for New Rea-
sons: Place of Injury As a Federal Solution to Choice of Law in Single-Accident Mass-Tort Cases,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (1992) (arguing in favor of a federal choice-of-law rule that
would govern single-accident mass tort cases unless all parties to a given case decide
not to invoke it).31 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 4, 21,
146 (1995) (expressing the need for a national tort law); see also Michael A. Coccia,
Uniform Product Liability Legislation: A Proposed Federal Solution, 1983 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
236, 265 ("[I]ndividual states have not, and cannot, resolve the present uncertainties
caused by the product liability tort litigation system. These uncertainties can only be
resolved by federal legislation."); Charles T. Kimmett, Rethinking Mass Tort Law, 105
YAlE L.J. 1713, 1714 (1996) (book review) (discussingJudge Weinstein's proposal for a
national tort law); Robert W. Kasten, Jr. & Gene Kimmelman, Is It Time for a Uniform
Product Liability Law?, A.B.A. J., May 1985, at 38 (debating the merits of a uniform fed-
eral1product liability law).
See Thomas E. Willging, Annotation, Mass Torts Problems and Proposals: A Report to
the Mass Torts Working Group, 187 F.R.D. 328, 421-25 (1999) (discussing proposals for
federal punitive damages legislation); Briggs L. Tobin, Comment, The "Limited Generos-
ity" Class Action and a Uniform Choice of Law Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-
Tort Punitive Damage Adjudication in the Federal Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457, 480 (1989)
("[A] federal court must be free to formulate a neutral, uniform standard of punitive
damage liability to be applied to the entire plaintiff class.").
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
See id. § 12112 (providing that employers must make reasonable accommoda-
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ily and Medical Leave Act of 1993 conferring various rights on em-
ployees, but private employers must pay for the accommodations re-
quired under the ActL
What has happened in mass tort litigation, by contrast, is that state
legislatures and state courts have expanded state tort remedies, while
the burden of providing those remedies has fallen partly on the state
courts and partly on the federal courts. This situation is the reverse of
what happens when the federal government legislates benefits that
must be provided at the expense of the states, state agencies, or oth-
ers. Still, it is not clear that that is a reasoned basis for changing all
the law that has been proposed to be changed in this room and else-
where.
There is nothing in the history of the aggregation devices we have
been discussing that gives any basis for believing that there is an exist-
ing federal mandate to make the kind of dramatic changes that have
been proposed." Rule 23 plainly was adopted to facilitate the en-
forcement of certain anti-discrimination statutes and certain federal
regulatory regimes like the federal antitrust and securities fraud stat-
utess' The class action device has been marvelously effective and rela-
tively uncontroversial in effectuating these substantive federal poli-
cies.39 The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 23, however, clearly
and explicitly indicate that the authors of the rule did not intend it to
change dramatically how mass tort cases are handled.40 Those who
propose expanding the use of federal class actions to litigate mass tort
claims in federal court thus can draw no support from the history of
Rule 23's adoption or the intentions of its drafters.
Two years after the adoption of Rule 23, Congress passed the Mul-
tions for persons with disabilities); see alsoVande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin.,
44 F.3d 588, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) ('The employer must be willing to consider making
changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and conditions in order to enable a
disabled individual to work.").
3s 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
See id. § 2612 (requiring employers to allow employees to take up to 12 weeks of
family leave a year).
See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text (listing proposed changes that
would displace state tort law in favor of federal law).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1) (B) advisory committee's note (noting that share-
holder actions, such as actions to compel the declaration of a dividend, should ordi-
narily be conducted as a class action).a1 S e In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (grant-
ing class certification in antitrust litigation against parties engaged in the production
and sale of refined sugar).
40 SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note ("A 'mass accident' resulting in
injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action....").
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tidistrict Litigation ("MDL") Acte' It was not passed in response to a
crisis in the tort system or backlogs of state tort claims crowding out
other worthy federal business. It was passed because of the electrical
equipment price-fixing cases and the problems posed by the man-
agement of complex antitrust cases.4 Since then, the MDL Act has
been quite successful in achieving its purposes both in the securities
fraud and antitrust areas.4 When the avalanche of private antitrust
litigation that will inevitably follow the Microsoft litigation is filed,"
the MDL Panel, and maybe even the class action rule, will be quite
useful as aggregation devices for handling those cases to the extent
that they share common questions of fact.
There is no basis, however, in the history of either Rule 23 or the
MDL Act for believing that there is a federal mandate for the aggrega-
tion of state tort claims. As with Rule 23, there is no basis for asserting
that the Congress in 1968 intended the MDL Act to be used to con-
solidate large numbers of mass tort claims for mass trial in a single
federal district court." Some have argued, however, that even if there
is no federal interest in providing for such aggregation, or federal pol-
icy frustrated by non-aggregation, there are fundamental inequities
when state tort claims are separately litigated. The suggestion seems
to be one of two related contentions. One is that it is wrong when an
airline passenger in seat 12A is entitled to punitive damages under the
law of the state that governs his claim and the passenger next to him
in seat 12B is not. Alternatively, one might reference any other sig-
nificant difference between the states on matters of tort law. It is ar-
41 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (providing for consolidation of cases from
different districts for pretrial proceedings).
4SeeRobert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law: The Appellate Model, 93
MIcH. L. REv. 703, 748 (1995) (noting that the MDL Act was a response to thousands
of electrical price-fixing cases).
43 SeeRichard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 1995 BYIU L. REV.
879, 885 (noting the growing role of consolidation in antitrust cases); Note, TheJudicial
Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1001, 1001 n.1 (1974)
(remarking on the role of MDL procedures in the expeditious disposition of nearly
2000 private damage actions involving 25,000 electrical equipment price-fixing claims).
"See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (making
findings of fact, including a finding that Microsoft enjoyed monopoly power in its rele-
vant market).
45 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40
(1998) (holding that § 1407 was not intended to be used to conduct mass trials in
transferee forums); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 779, 804-09 (1985) (asserting that transfers pursuant to § 1407
should be for pretrial purposes only).
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gued that the existence of such differences is unfair 6 This argument,
however, should have been addressed to James Madison or to Con-
gress. It does not belong in a symposium on the procedural chal-
lenges posed by mass tort litigation. When we have fifty states and de-
fer to state tort law, there will be such differences. These differences
belong in our federal system, and there is nothing wrong with such
disparate rules or outcomes. Our government is organized the way it
is to allow for precisely these differences.
Now assume both passengers are from the same state and their
claims are governed by the same state tort law. The second conten-
tion is that there is something wrong if the plaintiff in seat 12A gets a
large recovery and the plaintiff in 12B gets a much smaller recovery.
Our system, however, has never been organized or designed to assure
equality of outcome between similarly situated plaintiffs in tort litiga-
tion. Rather, it has been designed to provide equality of opportunity
to present evidence and arguments using common procedures before
an appropriately neutral decision maker.47 Who is to say whether the
judgment for plaintiff 12A is too high and the judgment for plaintiff
12B too low? Maybe they are both too high and too low. Our system
affords no objective measure for calculating such awards. The goal of
our system ought not to be equality of outcome in tort litigation, but
appropriate transsubstantive neutrality with respect to the procedures
afforded the litigants who have similar tort claims and who seek justice
in our civil courts.8
The discussion at this Symposium, like similar discussions held at
other venues over the last two decades, reminds me of Professor
Fuller's famous article in which he describes certain disputes that are
so polycentric-like setting wages and prices-that they do not belong
in our federal courts.4 The debate we have been having for many
years over the proper management of mass tort litigation sounds to
See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1001 (3d Cir. 1986) (recognizing
that different treatment of similarly situated plaintiffs in mass tort cases is partly a re-
sult of variations and permutations in the states' tort laws).
47 SeeJay Tidmarsh, UnattainableJustice The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits
of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1743-50 (1992) (noting that courts
should use transsubstantive techniques when they are available).
See id. at 1808-09 (arguing that transsubstantive procedures should not be aban-
doned in favor of special procedural rules that depend on the size or complexity of a
case).
49 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-
404 (1978) (noting that polycentric tasks, which exist when the disposition of a single
item or particular issue has implications for the proper disposition of every other item
or issue, are unsuitable for adjudication).
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me like such a polycentric dispute. This long debate has not resulted
in large groups of academics, judges, or practitioners coalescing
around certain articulate schools of thought about how we should
proceed-at least none that I have been able to identify. There is a
complete melange of views on whether aggregation of mass tort claims
is good or bad, and, if it is good, how it should and should not be ac-
complished.f There is wide disagreement among those who favor ag-
gregation over what changes should be made in our law and what
changes should not be made.5 ' Those who oppose aggregation of
mass tort claims oppose it for all sorts of different reasons. 2 After fif-
teen years of debate, it is rather remarkable that there is not a greater
commonality of view-at least among those on the same side of the
debate over whether or not aggregation is desirable.
In conclusion, I would urge us to return to Professor McGovern's
suggestion to expand the role of federal courts in coordinating pre-
trial activities while remanding cases to their original state or federal
courts for trial.5 3 We make a mistake if we think that any federal rule
change by itself will secure the fair and orderly adjudication of mass
tort claims, given the reality that the federal courts are not the only
forum where this game is played. If asbestos cases are bottled up in
See Barry F. McNeil & Beth L. Francsali, Mass Torts and Class Actions: Facing In-
creased Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483, 487-507 (1996) (asserting that aggregation of cases is
problematic and that courts can adquately address mass torts using conventional pro-
cedures); Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 441
(1986) (recognizing that reforms to aggregation procedures have been stalled due to a
lack of consensus regarding the substance of these reforms); Heather M. Johnson,
Note, Resolution of Mass Product Liability Litigation Within the Federal Rules: A Case for the
Increased Use of Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2829, 2379 (1996) (ar-
guing that more classes should be certified under Rule 23(b) (3)). But see Note, Class
Ceriffication in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1143
(1983) (concluding thatjoint litigation is superior to separate actions in mass accident
cases and proposing "increased use of the rule 23(b) (1) class action").
51 See Willging, supra note 32, at 417 (listing several proposals "to federalize se-
lected aspects of products liability standards while leaving other aspects to the states,"
and concluding that "such approaches seem to aggravate a preexisting problem");
Sofia Adrogue, Mass Tort Class Actions in the New Millennium, 17 REV. LITIG. 427, 430
(1998) (suggesting that viable mechanisms exist within the courts to curtail abuses of
mass tort aggregation devices); Johnson, supra note 50, at 2379 (suggesting several
changes to current practices by courts in mass tort cases).
52 See McNeil & Francsali, supra note 50, at 487-501 (describing objections to class
action treatment for mass torts).
5S See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative StrategyforFederal and StateJudges in
Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867 (2000) (suggesting that the federal courts
be given increased responsibility for pretrial activities, but that trials be handled by a
case's original court).
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federal court in Philadelphia, the plaintiffs' lawyers will go elsewhere.!
If federal courts are hostile to mass tort class actions, plaintiffs' coun-
sel will repair to more class action friendly state courts. s The same
goes for settlement class actions.-s
To manage mass tort litigation comprehensively in both state and
federal courts, we must do what Professor McGovern suggests: ex-
pand the use of federal courts to discover, assemble, and distribute
the information that is necessary for the actors in the system to make
informed judgments about the merits of their cases. That means
common discovery, and, as Mr. Rheingold has suggested, it means
whatever can be done to avoid the need for duplicative depositions,
document productions, and the like' When that is done, however,
let the litigants repair to their own courthouses and try their cases.
After they do, a verdict record will develop, settlement patterns will
emerge, and the lawyers and their clients will find their way to a just
and defensible outcome. To deal with the problem of state court out-
liers, the Anti-Injunction Ace should be amended to permit a trans-
feree judge in a § 1407'9 proceeding, or perhaps the MDL Panel itself,
to temporarily stay proceedings in those state courts where the prog-
ress of those cases might undermine the fair and efficient pretrial
management of the aggregated proceeding pending in federal court.
In short, the proper response to the phenomenon of complex mass
tort litigation today is to facilitate the consolidation of factually related
claims for pretrial discovery in an appropriate venue, but then, in
54 See Alexandra Makosky, Comment, The King's Bench Power in Pennsylvania: A
Unique Power that Provides Efficient Results, 101 DICK. L. REv. 671, 690 (1997) (observing
that, at one time, the Philadelphia court system was overburdened because it had re-
ceived the third highest number of asbestos cases in the country).
See Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 725 So. 2d 10, 11 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (ap-
proving a tobacco class action which had been decertified in federal court); Elizabeth
J. Cabraser, The Road Not Taken: Thoughts on the Fifh Circuit's Decertification of the Cas-
tano Class, SB24 ALI-ABA 433, 447 (1996) (asserting that after Castano, plaintiffs are
virtually compelled to file multiple suits in various state courts); Susan E. Kearns, Note,
Deceatification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1386, 1354 (1999)
(noting that after the class decertification in Castano, actions to certify statewide to-
bacco cases were filed across the nation).
See The Future of Class Actions in Mass Tort Cases: A Roundtable Discussion, 66
FoRDHAML. REv. 1657, 1663 (1998).
57 See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Succesful Mass Disaster
Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968) (describing the successful group discovery pro-
cess utilized in a mass litigation involving a prescription drug).
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
5' 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
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most cases, to try those tort claims in state and federal court in the
traditional manner.60
60 See Trangsrud, supra note 45, at 782 ("Althoughjoint discovery on common issues
is desirable in most mass tort cases, the joint trial of such issues requires .... substan-
tial departures from those [procedures] usually followed in simple tort cases and ad-
versely affect[s] the fairness of the entire adjudicative process."); Roger H. Trangsrud,
Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissen, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 69 (arguing that mass
trials are not the best method "to adjudicate mass tort cases" and "[t]he better course
is to coordinate and consolidate pretrialdiscovery and motion practice but then indi-
vidually try the tort cases in an appropriate venue").
